Abstract: Constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of checks and balances in presidential democracies. What conditions support balance in the separation of powers, and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among the branches of government: high stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about the public"s relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the experience of Honduras in 2008-09 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances. 
While presidential democracies are synonymous with constitutional arrangements that create multiple branches of government that have formal powers to check each other, actual governance is often dominated by the executive with few effective checks and little actual balance. Empowering multiple governmental agents requires "institutional emergence," that is the development of governing practices and norms after formal institutions are elaborated in a written constitution (Knight and Epstein 1996) . Though institutional emergence may be erratic, once an institutional practice is established it often prevails for many years. For example, the practice of judicial review in the United States is not supported by specific constitutional text; rather, judicial review gradually emerged as a result of strategic choices made by Supreme Court justices, presidents, and members of Congress (see e.g. Burns 2009 , Friedman 2009 Knight and Epstein 1996; Kramer 2004 ).
Yet, the institutional emergence of stable separation of powers systems is not inevitable. We argue that the answers to our general question about the dynamics of institutional emergence and our question about the course of events in Honduras in 2009 are intertwined. In this paper we seek to develop an explanation for why checks and balances will develop to reign in a presidential executive or why presidents are willing to risk conflict with the court or congress. Drawing on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States, we develop a simple game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system that emphasizes the role of the interplay between high stakes institutional rivalry and public opinion in creating or undermining checks and balances. In particular, the premises "that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go" (Montesquieu [1748] 1777, p.197) and, therefore, that "power is of an encroaching nature, and that… a mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a 1 Helmke (2010, p.738) examines cases "in which one national branch of government (executive, legislature, or judiciary) threatens the survival of another." We look at institutional emergence that Knight and Epstein (1996) view as a crucial part of developing effective checks and balances. Institutional emergence can create circumstances where one branch attempts to threaten another branch"s survival, but that is not always the outcome.
sufficient guard against… the tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government…" (Madison [ ] 1996a suggest the permanent potential for conflict among the branches of government in separation of powers systems. Yet, our formal analysis indicates that conflict between branches of government is unlikely to emerge when public opinion clearly supports or opposes some established distribution of authority in a separation of powers.
However, if politicians pursue their power-growth preferences when public sentiment is divided or cannot be authoritatively assessed; interbranch conflicts can become inflamed.
These insights can be applied to the Honduran case to determine whether events in Honduras were consistent with an identified equilibrium in the formal model and, if so, to reinterpret the Honduran Coup in light of these general separation of powers dynamics. To execute this approach, we first describe the Honduran constitution of 1982 and changes that increased incentives for judicial and legislative independence. We outline events in 2008-09 that began as institutional emergence of checks and balances and culminated in the removal of President Zelaya. Our analysis indicates that the confluence of newly incentivized legislative and judicial independence and high-stakes policies permitted inter-branch conflict to develop, and unclear or divided public opinion about government institutions allowed inter-branch conflict to grow into a crisis. A final section discusses the implications of our analysis for understanding the political dynamics that support stability in separation of powers systems.
The Theory of the Separation of Powers
Though the idea of dividing the functions of national government into independent, coordinate branches has deep intellectual roots, a fully developed theory of the separation of powers was first advanced by Montesquieu in his The Spirit of Law ([1748] 1777; see also Vile [1967] 1998). Montesquieu argues that "constant experience shews [sic] … that every man invested with power is apt to abuse it, and to carry his authority as far as it will go" ([1748] 1777, p. 197). To protect "liberty" against these potential abuses the "three sorts of power: the legislative, the executive…, [and] the judicial" must not be "united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates" (pp. 198-200) . By separating the powers of "enacting laws,… executing the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of individuals" Montesquieu argued that "tyrannical" government could be avoided since, for example, an independent executive might decline to enforce "tyrannical laws" (pp. 198-199) .
This theory of constitutional design inspired the structure of government in the US
Constitution. Yet Madison offered an important refinement of Montesquieu"s theory centered on the role of public opinion (Sheehan 2002 ). Montesquieu viewed the structure of government as the principle means of preventing tyranny and ensuring stability. Madison argued that the "equilibrium of… government… is maintained less by the distribution of its powers, than by the force of public opinion" ([1792] 1900, p. 87) . Discussing the alleged stability of the British system, Madison asserted, "If the nation were in favour of absolute monarchy, the public liberty would soon be surrendered by their representatives. If a republican form of government were preferred, how could the monarch resist the national will?" (p. 87). The separation of powers system is only an "auxiliary precaution" for preventing tyranny while a "dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government" ([1788] 1996b, p. 356 ; see also Kramer 2004 Kramer , 2006 Martin 2010; Sheehan 2002 ).
Madison"s critique of a mechanically balancing separation of powers implies a powerful alternative theory of the separation of powers rooted in popular sovereignty. Since "[p]ublic opinion sets bounds to every government, and is the real sovereign in every free one" (Madison [1791 , the People might be conceptualized as a "large sovereign entity doling out bits and pieces of power to various popular agents" (Wood 1981, p. 17) . The separation of powers, therefore, set up a system of competing agency in which the people would have multiple representatives, variously empowered or discouraged over time in relation to their varying fitness and faithfulness to the people (Ura and Wohlfarth 2010) . Thus, Madison argues the boundaries between and around the authority of the various branches of government will ultimately be settled by the people:
The several departments being perfectly coordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them… can pretend an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves…? also Friedman 2009; Fritz 2008; Hamilton [1788 Hamilton [ ] 1996c Kramer 2004, especially pp. 39-92, Knight and Epstein 1996) .
This Madisonian theory of an equilibrium in the separation of powers maintained by public opinion is a useful foundation for understanding conflict among coordinate branches of government. When the People are satisfied with the status quo, public opinion will defend it by applying pressure to politicians who wish to upset established institutional arrangements. When the People are dissatisfied they can provide support to preferred governmental agents who seek to enhance their authority. The People can adjudicate between branches of government when a politician tries to enhance their power at the expense of another, and a rational politician who expects he would be sanctioned by the People for making a move to enhance his power should not make such an attempt. Inter-institutional conflict can become crisis when politicians in the competing institutions both think they have popular support and the preferences of the public are unclear or unknown.
An Institutional Emergence Game
To investigate how inter-branch conflict arises and can become a crisis, we specify a simple model of strategic interaction between a president (P), a coordinate branch of government, which we will call a court (C), and the People (M). However, the "court" in the game may represent a legislature or a court. We designate it as a court to facilitate comparisons between the formal model and the Honduran case, in which the Supreme Court ultimately ordered the arrest of the President. We model a pivotal actor representing the People that has the preference that on balance is expressed by the public (i.e., tipping support for the President or the Court). The People, however, can include diverse groups with different political resources and capacities to express their political preferences. Groups within "the People" may express contradictory preferences that make it difficult for the institutional actors to determine whether they are likely to obtain their preferred outcome from an institutional emergence game.
The game is illustrated in Figure 1 .
< insert Figure 1 about here >
The game is played against the background of a status quo arrangement in which political power is shared between the president and the court. Both the president and the court prefer to expand their authority through formal changes to the constitution or by establishing informal precedents that enhance their power. 2 We presume that institutional actors value changes in their institutional authority whether they result from formal or informal mechanisms.
When an institution successfully expands its powers, it receives a payoff of α, while coordinate institutions suffer a loss of -α (we assume α > 0).
The People find one institutional actor to be more fit or faithful as a governmental agent than the other. Thus, the People desire that the authority of the preferred institution be enhanced relative to the status quo. The People receive a payoff of α when their preferred institution"s power is enhanced and a loss of -α when its power is diminished.
Play begins with politicians having their own assessments of the lay of the political landscape -what they assess to be the preference of the People. For simplicity, we assume there are two People types: a pro-president type (Z) selected with probability p, and a pro-court type (~Z) selected with probability 1 -p from a uniform distribution. The People are predisposed to resist changes in the balance in the separation of powers that are contrary to their preferred state of the world. The People are aware of their own type, but the president and court know only the probability distribution utilized to make the selection.
Once M"s type is selected, the president may initiate (I) action that would enhance executive power at a cost (c), or choose to accept the status quo (~I). 3 Since initiating is costly, we assume that P will not initiate an enhancement of presidential power if current political We restrict our analysis to conditions where the utility of gaining preferred institutional arrangements outweighs the cost of acting to obtain them, i.e. where α ≥ c. 4 Under this condition, four pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria prevail.
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If p < and p < the president does not initiate an expansion of executive powers. Payoffs for all actors are zero (0). This equilibrium is associated with an upper-bound condition on p (the probability that the People are of a pro-president type). When p is less than the identified upper bound, the probability that the People support a president"s attempt to extend her power is sufficiently low as to dissuade the executive from doing so. The status quo is protected and serious inter-branch conflict is prevented by the knowledge that the public is 4 It is evident that where α < c the status quo prevails since no actor is willing to initiate or contest an early action to enhance their authority given the costs of doing so. 5 The Madisonian theory of the separation of powers presumes that all institutional actors are a power-seeking type and the resulting inter-institutional rivalries are refereed by public sentiment. Our substantive claim is that this theory hinges on clear public signals to maintain a peaceful equilibrium in the separation of powers, and our formal model explores the implications that follow from the absence of strong information about public opinion. Since this theoretical issue does not hinge on the institutional actors" presentation and discovery of one another"s "types" (both are power-seeking), alternative solution concepts such as Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium add little value to the formal analysis above and beyond more simple Subgame Perfection.
unsupportive of constitutional change. Yet no progress is made at establishing or strengthening a norm of checks and balances.
Second, when p < and p > the president does not initiate an expansion of executive powers. Payoffs for all actors are zero (0). This equilibrium is associated with relatively low values of α (the benefit gained by winning a preferred institutional arrangement).
When the potential gains for securing preferred outcomes are sufficiently low, neither institutional actor will absorb the costs of action without especially strong beliefs that the People will ultimately support their choices. This equilibrium is, therefore, principally associated with low stakes opportunities to extend institutional power. hinges on a lower-bound condition on p. When p exceeds the defined lower bound, the president extends her authority with the ascent of the court. The relatively high probability that the People would ultimately resist judicial action to prevent the expansion of executive authority is a sufficiently strong threat against the court to prevent its obstructing the president.
The president"s powers are enhanced, and there is no open, extended conflict between the court and the president, but even though no crisis results checks and balances are weakened.
Fourth, when ≤ p ≤ the president initiates an expansion of executive powers, the court obstructs the expansion of executive authority, the president escalates the conflict, the court orders the president"s arrest, a pro-president type People revolt, and a pro- Values of p are large enough to induce the president to attempt to enhance her power but also low enough to catalyze judicial efforts to undermine the expansion of executive authority. This condition might reflect various political conditions, such as where real-time information about public opinion is difficult to obtain or when subgroups within the mass public exhibit divided loyalties to institutional actors. Equilibrium in this condition is characterized by inter-branch conflict that is ultimately resolved by either the People"s revolt against the court"s order to arrest the president or the People"s acceptance of the president"s removal from office. Either outcome can be viewed as a crisis.
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Comparative Statics
The identified equilibria of the game correspond to three observable states of the world:
maintenance of the status quo, expansion of executive authority and a weakening of checks and balances with the acceptance (or acquiescence) of the court, or inter-institution-conflict that can escalate into a crisis. These states are related to two parameters of the theoretical model: (1) the stakes of the potential conflict between branches relative to the costs of action and (2) the institutional players" beliefs about the People (essentially the probability that the People would ultimately back the president over the court). When there is little at stake, institutional actors have little incentive to absorb the costs of initiating or continuing a conflict. When the probability that the People prefer expanded executive authority is sufficiently low, the president will not initiate an attempt to expand executive powers. The equilibria associated with states of the world in which the status quo is maintained are indicated in the lower portion of Reina won the election, and though the military tried to prevent the change, the constitution was amended (Bowman 2002) . Since then, the military has followed civilian leadership (Ruhl 2010) , and Honduras"s democratic regime earned scores of "free" from Freedom House and "fully democratic" from scholars systematically evaluating regimes (Mainwaring et al. 2001; Bowman et al. 2005 ).
Yet, Honduras"s democracy still faced challenges, including a lack of effective checks and balances despite a formal separation of powers system. Congress and the Court did not exercise their constitutional powers to check executive power. 7 Moreover, the president was the strongest political actor because of his ability to grant political favors and influence other politicians" career chances, which created practical political obstacles for deputies or justices to check the president. 8 The resulting "asymmetries of bargaining power… in political competition" were a primary factor in creating and maintaining presidential supremacy (Knight and Epstein 1996, p. 91 (Stokes 1950, p. 280; Argueta 1989) , and because many Latin American presidents 7 Other challenges include immense poverty which makes it difficult for citizens to hold officials accountable (Taylor-Robinson 2010) , an overloaded judicial system, crime. 8 Interestingly, multiple actors working together had checked President Suazo (PLH 1982-85) in 1985 when he tried to determine the presidential candidates of both traditional parties. Both parties objected and the crisis was resolved by the military surrounding the Congress to defend democracy and use of a double simultaneous vote in 1985 so that multiple party factions competed in the general election (Schulz and Schulz 1994 (Moore 2008 ).
Yet, Zelaya"s moves to align Honduras with Venezuela represented the start of a critical political break between the president and other institutions and important actors. The alliance signaled that Zelaya had moved away from the ideological preference of the median members of the Congress and the Court. 12 Zelaya had also diverged from the two traditional, conservative political parties and from the Honduran business community.
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The Congress and Court later took steps to check him on other policies, and President
Zelaya grew more frustrated. The stakes got bigger on March 13, 2009 when President Zelaya 11 Zelaya"s foreign policy initiatives may have created a safe opportunity for the Congress to begin to check the president because the business community and leaders of the traditional parties clearly opposed the initiatives. 12 In surveys of deputies conducted by the University of Salamanca in 2006, the average self-placement on a 10-point left-right scale for deputies from the PLH was 5.35 and 6.79 for PNH deputies. The only leftist party is Unificación Democrática (PUD), for whom the average self-placement of deputies on the same scale was 1.00 and it has won only 5 of the 128 seats in the Congress (PELA 2008; also see Alcántara Sáez 2009). 13 The traditional parties are not ideologically based. Both defend elite interests and use clientelism as the basis for electoral competition (Rosenberg 1987; Taylor 1996; Ajenjo Fresno 2001; Ruhl 2010) . Nonetheless, in free and fair elections they still won 91% of seats in Congress in 2005 and have won every presidential election. Three nontraditional parties win a few seats in the Congress, but are not serious contenders for the presidency. Latinobarometer data shows that Hondurans are generally conservative, with an average ideological self-placement to the right of the regional average.
spoke at a military promotion ceremony and expressed interest in serving another term as president ("Mel acepta" 2009). Rumors quickly started that Zelaya wanted to amend the constitution so that he could be reelected. These rumors influenced actors" perceptions about other actors" preferences and what actions they might take in a political game. The confrontation over inter-branch rights to check each others" power began in earnest in March when President Zelaya"s cabinet issued a decree to hold a referendum asking the Honduran people whether they wanted to have a cuarto urna ("fourth ballot") at the regularly scheduled November 29 elections. The referendum would ask if people wanted to convene a constituent assembly to reform the constitution. 14 That proposal was interpreted by Zelaya"s opponents as a first step toward his continuing in power, which would be a violation of the constitution.
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The stakes were now very high for the president and the coordinate branches of government and for traditional parties and the business community. Zelaya"s opponents, in government and in the People, already did not like the direction of his policy, and now it appeared that he wanted to stay in power past January 2010. Given that the Congress and Court had only just begun to assert their power to check the president, their capitulation to the wishes of the executive would leave them weaker than they had been prior to 2008. The executive, in contrast, wanted to remain autonomous from checks by other branches of government -to regain the independence presidents previously enjoyed in Honduras.
14 Elections were already scheduled for November, as called for in the constitution. Both major parties had primaries in late 2008 to select their presidential candidates and departmental slates for Congress. The cuarto urna proposal could have been of value to the president even if it was not a tactic to enable him to continue in power past January 2010. Since the Court and Congress had shown that they were now willing to play their role in checks and balances, President Zelaya needed to augment his power if he wanted to be able to implement controversial left-leaning policy. Military support would be another way to strengthen his hand, and "Zelaya had cultivated excellent relations with the armed forces from the beginning of his term and had more than doubled their budget." Yet gaining military support was risky as the senior officers were steeped in Cold War ideology and did not support allying with Venezuela"s Chavez (Ruhl 2010, p.101) . 15 Zelaya denied that he wanted to seek reelection, and the cuarto urna ballot was worded so that it did not make this preference clear.
Uncertainty about Public Allegiances
Despite the high political stakes, hard evidence of the public"s orientations in the emerging crisis was very limited. Elections occur only every four years, and reliable survey research is rare in Honduras. Street protests are a common mode of expression in Honduras, but both preceding the peak crisis period of June and July 2009 and after Zelaya"s ouster, public protests were limited and divided. The absence of large-scale, one sided protests suggests that neither President Zelaya nor his opponents enjoyed strong majority support in the Honduran public, though the business community had clearly articulated its opposition to many of the president"s policies. This inference is supported by the data that are available. Close election results, the absence of extensive protest activity, and surveys indicating divided loyalties in the mass public suggest that Honduran political leaders lacked a clear picture of public opinion. They could not know if the people would back President Zelaya, or the Court and Congress as they tried to check the executive. It could be argued that the people (other than the business community) were largely disinterested in the inter-branch conflict until it became the very high stakes stalemate right before the coup, and that divided loyalties in the mass public actually emerged from the stalemate before, and even more so, after the coup.
The Constitutional Crisis
The combination of high stakes disagreements between branches of government and uncertainty about public support is associated in our formal model with an equilibrium prediction of inter-branch conflict. This conflict takes the form of an escalating crisis in which neither side in a dyadic conflict has incentives to abandon a confrontation once it is initiated.
Institutional actors will continue to pursue their preferred set of formal and informal constitutional arrangements (even facing obstruction by other actors) until the public has some opportunity to adjudicate the conflict.
The inter-branch conflict over policy and checks and balances that began in 2008 expanded into a constitutional crisis on March 23, 2009 when President Zelaya"s cabinet issued a decree to hold a referendum on June 28 about adding the cuarto urna to the November elections to ask people whether they wanted to convene a constituent assembly. The Court of Administrative Litigation responded in May by declaring the referendum illegal. When the cabinet issued another decree substituting a national poll for the referendum, it was also declared illegal. (See Table 1 In particular, the model shows that relative values of p, c, and α which are associated with an initial "round" of conflict between P and C are also within the set of values for these variables that will sustain the conflict into the future.
Discussion
The Honduran constitutional crisis of 2009 represents an inherent tension in all separation of powers systems. By dividing state power among branches of government, the system is designed to protect individual liberties by entrusting each branch to police the others.
Since each branch will be jealous of its prerogatives and powers, the system allows 18 Based on the partisan makeup of the Court and Congress, and the conservative views of both traditional parties, it is likely that the Congress and Court had the same preferences. The Court in 2009 had 8 PLH and 7 PNH justices. In the Congress the PLH and PNH held 91% of the seats, though some PLH deputies supported Zelaya.
" [a] mbition… to counteract ambition," enforcing limits on government power 1996b, p.356). Ultimately, conflict over the "boundaries between [the branches"] respective powers" must be settled by "an appeal to the people themselves…" These types of inter-branch conflicts are especially likely to emerge in the early stages of a political system"s development when constitutional systems" formal boundaries on institutional power lack the support of prior interpretation and experience (Knight and Epstein 1996) , inviting conflict as institutional actors explore the extent of their authority through trial and error before arriving at a workable equilibrium. Moreover, lack of experience with particular institutional forms may lead to uncertainty or ambivalence in the public mind on questions relating to the appropriate balance to strike in the separation of powers.
Honduras"s constitution is less than 30 years old. Reforms to enhance representation in Congress and create judicial independence are less than a decade old. It is natural to expect a president to want to retain or enhance executive authority, so presidents are often willing to take the risk of challenging the Congress or Court. It is also natural to expect that the public will be unsure about the utility of new institutional arrangements. It is precisely this combination of ambition and uncertainty that makes inter-branch conflict rational for power-seeking politicians.
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Yet, the Honduran case represents only one possible equilibrium result in our theoretical model -open conflict between branches of government that becomes a crisis. Another equilibrium result is that presidents will seek to expand executive power and will obtain it with the support (or acquiescence) of other branches of government when public support for enhanced presidential power is sufficiently high. This suggests that President Zelaya might have obtained a reformed constitution -without serious obstruction from the Court or Congress -had the public expressed clear support for the president early-on after Zelaya"s cabinet issued the cuarto urna proposal.
These dynamics are evident in other cases. In Argentina in the early 1990s President
Menem was able to expand presidential decree powers at a time when Argentines were desperate for government to fix the country"s economic problems. Menem regularly used Need and Urgency Decrees (NUDs) to legislate by decree on diverse policy topics though the constitution prior to the 1994 reform did not grant the executive such a power. The Congress and Court did not object vociferously or consistently, for various reasons, including because the public was demanding "quick and effective policy making" (Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998, p.58) . Though this extension of presidential power did not produce a regime crisis, checks and balances were weakened (Jones 1997; Ferreira Rubio and Goretti 1998 (Fritz 2008 ).
The final equilibrium state predicted by our model is that when either the stakes of interinstitutional conflict are low or public support for the status quo is relatively strong, a preexisting balance of powers will be sustained. Savvy unpopular presidents do not attempt to expand executive power. However, this outcome presumes that the president knows he is unpopular.
This last theoretical result bears additional discussion. The status quo may be maintained -even when public support for change is sufficiently high as to dissuade obstruction from other branches of government -if the potential gain from such action is relatively low. This suggests that policy agreement among the branches of government, perhaps associated with unified party control, represents an important "loophole" in the Madisonian theory of competing public agency. In this case the people are placed in a dangerous position by the absence of a viable alternative agent. Should divergence emerge between the public and all of its governmental agents, public disaffection with specific policies or sets of policies will have no outlet, creating a serious crisis of representation.
Conclusions and Implications
The We have argued that our theoretical understanding of the separation of powers can provide insight into events in Honduras and that the Honduran crisis provides a useful basis for applying and refining these theories. We show how a Madisonian theory of the separation of powers anticipated a system of competing public agency among branches of government. As institutional actors vary in their fitness or faithfulness as agents of the people, the public might variously empower those institutions that best represent their preferences. This implies that the People serve as a balancing force in the separation of powers, endorsing or constraining the natural tendency of each branch to expand its authority at the expense of others.
To explore the mechanics of the system, we developed a model of institutional rivalry showed that a majority of Hondurans opposed Zelaya"s ouster, though they also objected to his attempt to change the constitution, and 75% opposed the cuarto urna election.
and checks and balances that have been hallmarks of sustainable presidential systems. When the executive was unwilling to accept the other branches" power, however, the result was crisis. 
